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Liberalizing the Mansfield Rule in Missouri:
Making Sense of the Extraneous Evidence
Exception after Travis v. Stone
Williams v. Daus'
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, courts have been very reluctant to allow jurors to impeach
their own verdicts. Untrusting of jurors who would testify about their own
misconduct, Lord Mansfield was the first to set forth a strict rule rendering
such evidence inadmissible.2 Since its exportation to the United States, the
"Mansfield Rule" has been divorced from its original policy underpinnings
and subjected to various liberalizing exceptions recognized by state and fed-
eral courts seeking to avoid the harshness of the rule. 3 As a result, the law
governing the admissibility of juror testimony has been unclear and often
inconsistent.
Since the advent of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), many state courts
have admitted juror testimony regarding the alleged gathering of extra-
judicial evidence by jurors.4 It is currently unclear whether Missouri recog-
nizes the "extraneous evidence" exception as an independent exception to the
Mansfield Rule or whether Missouri only recognizes such an exception when
the opposing party fails to object to the admissibility of the juror testimony.
In Missouri, to obtain a new trial based on juror misconduct, a two step
process must be used.5 First, admissible evidence of misconduct must be
presented, and second, the evidence of misconduct must be sufficient to con-
vince the trial court that the misconduct prejudiced a party.6 This Note exam-
ines the current status of Missouri law governing the first prong of this analy-
sis: the admissibility of juror testimony offered to establish juror misconduct
involving the gathering of extra-judicial evidence.
1. 114 S.W.3d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (transfer to the Missouri Supreme
Court denied on Sept. 30, 2003).
2. Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
3. See generally Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justi-
fied?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509 (1988).
4. See, e.g., Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. 2002) (en banc); Stotts v.
Meyer, 822 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); see also infra notes 50-51 and accom-
panying text.
5. Neighbors v. Wolfson, 926 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that
once juror testimony is held competent, the moving party has the burden of proving
prejudice to the verdict).
6. Id.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Dissatisfied with a prior physician's inability to treat her chronic back
pain, Madonna Williams ("Williams") sought medical treatment from Dr.
Arthur Daus ("Daus") who diagnosed her with nerve root compression and
recommended surgery to treat the condition.7 Complications from the first
surgery required a second, 8 which resulted in worse pain and disability than
Williams had suffered before Daus recommended surgical intervention. 9
Prior to Daus's diagnosis, several other physicians had diagnosed Williams
with a lumbosacral strain, a condition which usually heals over time without
surgery.'0 Expert testimony revealed that Daus had misdiagnosed Williams
and performed unnecessary surgery.' 1
Williams brought a medical malpractice suit against Daus seeking dam-
ages for her worsened post-operative condition.' 2 The jury returned a verdict
against Daus and awarded Williams a total of $1 million in damages, com-
pensating Williams for economic, medical, and non-economic injuries.' 3
Daus filed a series of post-trial motions, 14 including a motion for new trial
based on the alleged misconduct of a juror in acquiring and relating to the
jury extra-judicial evidence relevant to the case. 15
Daus presented the affidavit of one of the jurors, Ms. Messer
("Messer"), along with the testimony of three other jurors in support of his
motion for new trial.' 6 These four jurors consistently testified that during
deliberations, Juror No. 2 said she had visited Daus's hospital.17 Collectively,
the jurors testified that Juror No. 2 had told the jury that Daus had other law-
suits pending against him, was in danger of losing his malpractice insurance,
and would probably lose his license to practice medicine if he lost this case.'
8
Williams objected to the testimony and made repeated motions to strike on
the basis of hearsay, but "[t]he trial court overruled these objections and re-
7. Williams v. Daus, 114 S.W.3d 351, 357-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (transfer to
the Missouri Supreme Court denied on Sept. 30, 2003).
8. Id. at 358.
9. Id. at 361.
10. Id. at 359-60.
11. Id. at 360.
12. Id. at 357.
13. Id. at 358. The jury awarded "$200,000 for past economic and medical dam-
ages; $200,000 for past non-economic damages; $200,000 for future medical dam-
ages; $200,000 for future non-medical economic damages; and $200,000 for future
non-economic damages." Id.
14. Id. Williams filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remitti-
tur, and new trial. Id.
15. Id. at 364.
16. Id. at 367.
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ceived evidence of juror misconduct."'19 Despite receiving this evidence and
without setting forth the reasons for its conclusion, the trial court denied
Daus's motion for new trial and entered judgment for Williams.
20
Among Daus's several points on appeal 2' was his contention that the
trial court erred in not granting his motion for new trial based on juror mis-
conduct. 22 Daus argued that the testimony of the four jurors was admissible
despite the general rule that juror testimony about misconduct affecting delib-
erations may not be used to impeach the jury's verdict.23 The general rule
prohibits admitting the testimony if it is introduced to show that jurors acted
on improper reasoning, beliefs, motives, or mental operations.24 Daus con-
tended that the testimony was admissible under an exception to this general
rule because the jurors' testimony alleged that extrinsic evidentiary facts had
been interjected into the deliberations rather than that the jurors had merely
acted on improper reasoning, beliefs, motives, or mental operations.25 Wil-
liams responded by arguing that her timely objection to admission of the ju-
rors' testimony served as an absolute bar to its admissibility. 26 The court
chose not to rule on this basis and instead held that the jurors' testimony was
inadmissible hearsay.27 In the alternative, the court inferred that the trial
court had found that Juror No. 2 never actually visited the hospital even
though she had told the other jurors she visited it. As a result, the court held
that such remarks would be matters "inherent in the verdict," rendering them
inadmissible. 29 Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Daus's motion for new trial. The court held
that the jurors' testimony was inadmissible hearsay and, in the alternative,
that Juror No. 2's statements were not evidence of extra-judicial misconduct
because Juror No. 2 had not actually gathered extra-judicial evidence. 30
19. Id. at 367-68.
20. Id. at 358. The trial judge denied Daus's other post-trial motions as well. Id.
21. Daus raised five points on appeal; points I, II, III, and V are not relevant to
the jury misconduct issue and beyond the scope of this Note.
22. Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 364.
23. Id.
24. Id. These are also referred to as "matters inherent in the verdict."
25. Id.
26. Id. at 366.
27. Id. at 367.
28. Id. at 369.
29. Id. at 367 (citing Neighbors v. Wolfson, 926 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996); Williams Carver Co. v. Poos Bros., 778 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989)).
30. Id. at 369.
2004]
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Before 1785, courts would cautiously receive jurors' testimony regard-
ing their own misconduct. 31 In that year, everything changed when Lord
Mansfield, in the English case of Vaise v. Delaval,32 set forth a new standard
upholding the sanctity of the jury room and protecting jury verdicts from
impeachment by the jurors who render them. 33  The "Mansfield Rule,"
adopted in most U.S. jurisdictions, prohibits parties from using affidavits or
testimony of jurors to impeach verdicts. 34 Although the rule was initially
accepted without qualification in the United States, two general exceptions to
the rule gained popularity in the mid-nineteenth century and continue to
shape modem jurisprudence. 35
In Wright v. llinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co.,36 the Iowa Supreme
Court held that "affidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of avoid-
ing a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury
room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict." 37 Under this rule of
broad admissibility, a juror could not "testify that he misunderstood the
charge or had reservations about the verdict," because proof of such matters
rested "within the conscience of that juror alone." 38 A prominent case de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1874, Perry v. Bailey,39 cited the
"Iowa Rule" from Wright with approval and held that matters inherent in the
verdict included a juror's ignorance of the law or facts in the case and his
statements that other jurors had improperly influenced his decision.40
31. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915).
32. 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785); see also Shearin v. Fletcher/Mayo/Assocs.,
Inc., 687 S.W.2d 198, 205-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing the origin of the Mans-
field Rule).
33. Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944 ("The Court cannot receive such an affidavit from
any of the jurymen themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high misde-
meanor: but in every such case the Court must derive their knowledge from some
other source: such as from some person having seen the transaction through a win-
dow, or by some such other means.") (footnote omitted).
34. Stotts v. Meyer, 822 S.W.2d 887, 888-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). This rule
generally applies whether the alleged misconduct occurs inside or outside the jury
room and whether it occurs before or after the jury is discharged. Id.
35. Crump, supra note 3, at 514.
36. 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
37. Id. at 209 (emphasis added). Note that Missouri has adopted Wright's defini-
tion of "matters inherent in the verdict." See Baumle v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 341, 348
(Mo. 1967).
38. Crump, supra note 3, at 515.
39. 12 Kan. 539 (1874).
40. Id. at 544.
[Vol. 69
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The second general exception to the Mansfield Rule, first recognized by
the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Woodward v. Leavitt,41 allowed a juror
to testify as to the existence of extraneous influences but not as to the effect
those influences had upon a juror's thought process.42 Under this test, jurors
could testify in support of their verdict that no extraneous influences had
prejudiced their decision, but could not testify as to their motives or mental
operations which operated to produce the verdict.43
In the federal arena, the U.S. Supreme Court initially cited the Perry and
Woodward exceptions with approval in Mattox v. United States,44 but later
strayed from this analysis by applying general public policy considerations
not originally accounted for by the Mansfield jurisprudence. 45 After Mans-
field was divorced from its original justification, the federal courts began
applying inconsistent tests that achieved contradictory results until the draft-
ers of the Federal Rules of Evidence promulgated Rule 606(b).46
41. 107 Mass. 453 (1871).
42. Id. at 466.
43. State v. Babb, 680 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (excluding juror
testimony by applying the doctrine elaborately considered and declared in Wood-
ward).
44. 146 U.S. 140, 148-49 (1892) (deeming competent juror affidavits which
alleged that the bailiff had informed the jury of extraneous evidence and that newspa-
pers accounts of the trial were brought into deliberations).
45. Crump, supra note 3, at 519 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915), which did not apply Perry or Woodward
and excluded juror testimony based on public policy considerations of juror harass-
ment, free and frank discussions in the jury room, and litigants' tampering with jury
verdicts to prevent finality of litigation). The Mansfield Rule had originally been
"concerned solely with the untrustworthy nature of juror affidavits" and not the policy
considerations relied upon by the Court in McDonald. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court
still premises its discussion of the Mansfield non-impeachment rule on "finality of
verdicts and encourages frank and free jury deliberation, while discouraging harass-
ment of jurors by losing parties." See 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 68 (John Wil-
liam Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 119-20
(1987).
46. Crump, supra note 3, at 519-20.
2004]
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B. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 47 though rooted in the original Mans-
field Rule,48 was the product of a delicate political balance struck between the
two competing policy considerations of promoting justice through verdicts
rendered by impartial juries and promoting the stability and finality of the
jury decision-making process.49 Rule 606(b) has been adopted in substantial
form by, or has influenced the rule used by, many state jurisdictions and has
been said to conceal the accommodation "between an accurate process for
seeking truth and a stable jury system." 50 Favoring exclusion of juror testi-
mony impeaching the verdict, "[Rule] 606(b) bars juror testimony or [affida-
vits] to prove any matter occurring or statement made during deliberations
unless it [falls under] either of two exceptions.",51
The first exception recognized in Rule 606(b) allows verdicts to be im-
peached by juror testimony that alleges "the jury improperly received 'extra-
neous prejudicial information' during deliberations." 52 Federal courts have
struggled to define the subject matter that is included within this vague cate-
gorical exception. 53 This exception has been interpreted to allow proof that
one or more jurors conducted an unauthorized experiment, a private investi-
gation into the parties or controversy during deliberations, or an unauthorized
visit to the premises involved in the controversy. 54 The distinction between
irregularities occurring inside and outside of the jury room was rejected by
the Advisory Committee in favor of a rule drawing the line instead between
47. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) states in relevant part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other ju-
ror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from
the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought
to bear upon any juror.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b). The Revised Uniform Rule of Evidence 606(b) is substantially
the same. UNIF. R. EVID. 606(b) (1974); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 45,
§ 68, at 260 n.20.
48. The advisory committee to Rule 606(b) labeled Lord Mansfield's rubric a
"gross oversimplification." FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee's note.
49. See id.
50. Crump, supra note 3, at 525.
51. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE
UNDER THE RULES § 6.11, at 654 (2d ed. 1999).
52. Id. § 6.12, at 661.
53. Crump, supra note 3, at 522.
54. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 51, § 6.12 (considering various federal
cases where courts admitted juror evidence of extraneous prejudicial information).
[Vol. 69
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testimony about mental processes and testimony about conditions calculated
to improperly influence the verdict, without regard to whether these occurred
inside or outside the jury room. 5 However, Rule 606(b), preserving the dis-
tinction first recognized by Woodward,56 renders juror testimony admissible
to prove the existence of extraneous information, but renders juror testimony
inadmissible to prove the "effect such information had on any juror."57
The second exception recognized in Rule 606(b) allows "impeachment
of verdicts by evidence of an 'outside influence' improperly brought to bear
on a juror.,58 Courts have recognized such improper influences under Rule
606(b) when blatant attempts were made to bribe jurors, threaten jurors or
their families, or otherwise influence jurors.59
The Advisory Committee's Note identifies an important, but often over-
looked, distinction between two separate issues.60  First, Rule 606(b) and
comparable state rules involve only the issue of competency.6 1 Second, the
separate question arises as to what kinds of activities or influences, notwith-
standing the evidence used to establish them, will be sufficient to justify a
new trial.62 The first issue is a "rules-of-evidence question," while the second
is an issue of "judicial discretion to grant new trials." 63 Courts' repeated con-
fusion of these two issues, along with courts' failure to consider the proper
policy underpinnings of the competency rules, may account for the unharmo-
nious and confusing jurisprudence which often plagues this area of law.64
55. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 9 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7083 ("The Advisory Committee note in the 1971 draft stated that '. . . the door of thejury room is not a satisfactory dividing point, and the Supreme Court has refused to
accept it."').
56. See supra notes 41-43.
57. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 51, § 6.12 (emphasis added) (citing
United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 235 (2d. Cir. 1975)).
58. Id. § 6.13.
59. Id.; see also Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563, 566-67 (6th Cir. 1977); Sti-
mack v. Texas, 548 F.2d 588, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1977).
60. EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 139 (David
A. Schlueter ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter EMERGING PROBLEMS]; see also FED. R.
EVID. 606(b) advisory committee's note ("This rule does not purport to specify the
substantive grounds for setting aside verdicts for irregularity; it deals only with the
competency of jurors to testify concerning those grounds.").
61. EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 60, at 139.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence of Jury Trials: The No
Impeachment Rule and the Conditions for Legitimate Legal Decisionmaking, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 57, 92-93 (1993) (speaking of "a glaring inconsistency between the
application of the rule and the reasons ordinarily recited to justify its existence");
Crump, supra note 3, at 525.
2004]
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C. Mansfield in Missouri and Travis v. Stone
Missouri courts originally adopted a qualified form of the Mansfield
Rule. In cases where life and liberty were at stake, they would receive jurors'
affidavits to explain extrinsic evidence showing juror misconduct. 6' How-
ever, this qualification was soon eliminated in favor of a strict application of
the Mansfield Rule, prohibiting jurors from impeaching their verdict.66 This
remained the prevailing interpretation of Missouri law, with limited excep-
tion, for over a century.
67
The Missouri Supreme Court began to retreat from the harshness of the
Mansfield rule when, in dictum, it stated that a juror might impeach the jury's
verdict based upon the misconduct of a juror, provided that the opposing
party failed to make a timely and proper objection.68 Though this exception
was initially questioned,69 Missouri courts now consistently hold that juror
testimony impeaching the verdict is admissible in the absence of a timely and
proper objection by the opposing party. 7° But, it is currently unclear whether
65. Pratte v. Coffman, 33 Mo. 71, 78 (1862); see also Shearin v.
Fletcher/Mayo/Assocs., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 198, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (Dixon, J.,
concurring) (discussing Missouri's adoption of the Mansfield Rule in Pratte).
66. State v. Branstetter, 65 Mo. 149 (1877) (relying on Sawyer v. Hannibal & St.
Jo. R.R. Co., 37 Mo. 240 (1866), State v. Coupenhaver, 39 Mo. 430 (1867), and State
v. Underwood, 57 Mo. 40 (1874)).
67. See Shearin, 687 S.W.2d at 205 (Dixon, J., concurring) ("This perception of
Missouri law was reiterated in: State v. Babb, 680 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. 1984); State ex
rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Ballwin Plaza Corp., 474 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Mo.
1971); McDaniel v. Lovelace, 439 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Mo. 1969); Smugala v. Cam-
pana, 404 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo. 1966); Romandel v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,
254 S.W.2d 585, 595-96 (Mo. 1953); Middleton v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,
348 Mo. 107, 152 S.W.2d 154 (1941); Reich v. Thompson, 346 Mo. 577, 142
S.W.2d 486 (1940); State v. Westmoreland, 126 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1939); Steffen v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 331 Mo. 574, 56 S.W.2d 47 (1932); Evans v.
Klusmeyer, 301 Mo. 352, 256 S.W. 1036, 1039 (1923); State v. Shields, 296 Mo. 389,
246 S.W. 932, 934 (1922).").
68. Id. (citing Cook v. Kansas City, 214 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. 1948) and Mayberry
v. Clarkson Constr. Co., 482 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1972)) ("'[I]t is a firmly established
rule in this jurisdiction that a juror may not, by his own affidavit or testimony, im-
peach the jury's verdict because of the misconduct of a juror (citations omitted) unless
the respondents failed to timely and properly object to the juror doing so and thereby
in turn waived the incompetency of the juror to impeach the verdict."') (alterations in
original) (quoting Cook, 214 S.W.2d at 433-34).
69. See Shearin, 687 S.W.2d at 206-07 (Dixon, J., concurring) (arguing that the
principle of waiver is inapplicable since the Mansfield Rule is not based upon privi-
leged communications).
70. See Stotts v. Meyer, 822 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); see also
Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. 2002) (en banc); Hale v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 522, 528 n. 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("Affidavits and testimony of
jurors are generally inadmissible to impeach a verdict. The inadmissibility of such
[Vol. 69
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the absence of an objection is an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility of
juror testimony in Missouri.7' Courts are inconsistent as to whether the ab-
sence of objection is a necessary element in establishing the admissibility of
juror testimony 72 or merely an independent exception to the Mansfield Rule.73
Missouri courts have also begun to liberalize the Mansfield Rule by
recognizing exceptions similar to those present in Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b). 74 In Stotts v. Meyer,75 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District, applying the "extraneous evidence" exception, 76 held a juror's testi-
mony admissible because it related to extra-judicial evidence the juror had
gathered and related to the other jurors.77 In Stotts, Juror Flippo testified that
he had visited the scene of the automobile accident at issue to verify the evi-
dence presented at trial.78 He also stated in an affidavit that he had learned
during deliberations that other jurors had visited the scene as well.79 In a
footnote, the court commented that it was only considering Flippo's testi-
mony as to his own visit because, in the court's opinion, his statements about
the other jurors' visits constituted inadmissible hearsay.80 The court held that
Flippo's testimony about his own visit was admissible because it did not fall
within "the purview of 'matters inherent in the verdict." '81 Flippo's testi-
evidence may, however, be waived by its receipt without objection.") (citations omit-
ted); Shearin, 687 S.W.2d at 203 (holding the juror testimony impeaching the verdict
admissible since the opposing party had not objected to its admissibility).
71. The Williams court avoided reaching this issue after addressing the apparent
conflict between Neighbors v. Wolfson, 926 S.W.3d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996), and
State v. Stephens, 88 S.W.3d 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). See Williams v. Daus, 114
S.W.3d 351, 366-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) ("[W]e need not consider the arguments of
the parties relative to whether the hearing court could even consider evidence of juror
misconduct, where a proper objection to the receipt of the evidence by the hearing
court had been lodged.").
72. See Neighbors, 926 S.W.2d at 37.
73. See Stephens, 88 S.W.3d at 882-83 (arguing that the absence of an objection
is merely an alternative basis for allowing juror testimony to impeach the verdict).
74. Stotts, 822 S.W.2d at 889 n.4 (recognizing the extraneous evidence exception
and the improper outside influence exception present in Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b), as well as the difficulty courts have interpreting these exceptions).
75. 822 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
76. This exception is referred to as the "extraneous prejudicial information"
exception under the discussion of Federal Rule 606(b). See Part III.B supra.
77. Stotts, 822 S.W.2d at 890.
78. Id. at 891.
79. Id. at 888.
80. Id. at 888 n. 1.
81. Id. at 890. The court defines "matters inherent in the verdict" to include
instances where
the juror did not understand the law as contained in the court's instruc-
tions, [the juror] did not join in the verdict, [the juror] voted a certain way
due to a misconception of the evidence, [the juror] misunderstood the
2004]
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mony did not extend to the subjective reasoning used by the jury in reaching
the verdict, but rather related to a juror's gathering of extraneous evidence, an
activity denounced by Missouri courts.
82
In Neighbors v. Wolfson,8 3 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the West-
em District interpreted the Stotts opinion narrowly. The court held that juror
testimony alleging that extrinsic evidentiary facts had been interjected into
deliberations could be admissible evidence, but only if the opposing party
acquiesced in the competency of such evidence by failing to object.84 Even
though the jurors' testimony alleged that extrinsic evidentiary facts8 5 had
"infiltrated the jury's deliberation[s]," the court held the evidence inadmissi-
ble because the opposing party had properly objected to its admissibility. 6 In
Stotts, the Eastern District had held Juror Flippo's testimony admissible on
two grounds: that it related to a juror's gathering of extraneous evidence and
that the opposing party failed to object.87 In Neighbors, the Western District
held that both "conditions" had to be met before juror testimony could be
admitted to impeach the verdict.
88
Recently, in Travis v. Stone,89 the Missouri Supreme Court appeared to
accept the extraneous evidence exception recognized by Stotts but did not
have reason to resolve the inconsistency between Stotts and Neighbors."° In
Travis, Juror Zink testified at a post-trial hearing that she had visited the
scene of the accident at issue in the case during a break in the testimony of an
accident reconstruction expert. 91  After receiving an adverse verdict, the
plaintiff filed a motion for new trial on the basis of juror misconduct.92 The
statements of a witness, [the juror] was mistaken in his calculations, or
other matters "resting alone in the juror's breast."
Id. at 889. (quoting Baumle v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 341, 348 (Mo. 1967)). In Baumle,
the Missouri Supreme Court accepted the definition of "matters inherent in the ver-
dict" first adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court in Wright, discussed in Part III.A su-
pra. See Baumle, 420 S.W.2d at 348.
82. Stotts, 822 S.W.2d at 890.
83. 926 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
84. Id. at 37-38.
85. Id. The affidavits of four jurors indicated that during deliberations the jury
had viewed and discussed a booklet containing information on the risks of Pitocin, a
labor-inducing drug, which was related to a central issue in the case. Id.
86. Id. at 38.
87. Stotts, 822 S.W.2d at 891.
88. Neighbors, 926 S.W.2d at 37.
89. 66 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
90. Id. at 4. "The general rule in Missouri is that a juror's testimony about jury
misconduct allegedly affecting deliberations may not be used to impeach the jury's
verdict. However, it is permissible to elicit testimony about juror misconduct that
occurred outside the jury room, such as the alleged gathering of extrinsic evidence at
issue here." Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
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defendants failed to object to the admissibility of Zink's testimony but argued
that her visit did not prejudice the verdict.9 3 The Missouri Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's denial of a new trial, holding that Zink's testimony
was admissible and had created a presumption of prejudice which defendants
failed to rebut.94 Since the defendants had failed to object to the juror testi-
mony offered to impeach the verdict, the court did not have reason to deter-
mine whether such testimony relating to extraneous evidence would be inde-
pendently admissible even in the face of objection.
In State v. Stephens,95 a post-Travis criminal case, the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District held that juror testimony alleging that extra-
neous evidence had been gathered by a juror was admissible despite a timely
and proper objection. 96 The Stephens court interpreted Travis to mean that
the absence of an objection was merely an alternative basis for admissibility
of the juror testimony rather than a mandatory prerequisite to admissibility.97
In Stephens, the assistant prosecutor spoke with a juror after trial who told her
that, prior to deliberations, an unnamed juror had visited a park where part of
the alleged crime occurred.98 The state objected to admission of this evi-
dence, arguing that a jury's verdict could not be impeached by the testimony
of a juror.99 The defendant appealed the court's denial of his motion for new
trial, arguing that Travis had recognized an exception to the general rule of
inadmissibility where the juror testimony alleges that a juror gathered extra-
neous evidence. 10t The state interpreted Travis as only allowing juror testi-
mony to impeach the verdict where the opposing party had failed to object to
admissibility.' 0 ' Since the state had timely objected, it claimed that the ju-
ror's testimony was inadmissible. Rejecting the state's interpretation, the
court held that the failure to object was merely an alternative basis for admis-
sibility and that Travis had indeed recognized an independent extraneous
evidence exception allowing the use of juror testimony to impeach the verdict
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id. at 6. The court relied on its prior holding in Middleton v. Kansas City
Public Service Co., 152 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1941), which held that a presumption of
prejudice arises when a party has established that a juror gathered evidence extrane-
ous to the trial. Travis, 66 S.W.3d at 4.
95. 88 S.W.3d 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
96. See id. "No rational basis appears for distinguishing between civil and
criminal cases as to the issue presented." Id. at 882 n.3. Note, however, that com-
mentators have suggested that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments may have spe-
cial implications on applying the no impeachment rule to criminal cases. See Crump,
supra note 3, at 524; see also Cammack, supra note 64, at 68-69 (citing Parker v.
Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966)).
97. Stephens, 88 S.W.3d at 882-83.
98. Id. at 879.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 881-82.
101. Id. at 882.
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despite a timely objection. 0 2 After holding the juror testimony admissible,
the court affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds that the miscon-
duct had not prejudiced the defendant.10 3
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
In Williams v. Daus,1°4 the Missouri Court of Appeals considered,
among other issues,105 whether the trial court had abused its discretion in
denying Daus's motion for new trial based on allegations that a juror had
obtained extra-judicial evidence from a visit to Daus's hospital and then re-
lated these findings to the other jurors. °6 The majority began its analysis of
the jury misconduct issue by stating the general rule in Missouri, that a juror's
testimony about misconduct allegedly affecting deliberations could not be
used to impeach the jury's verdict. 10 7 Tracing this "firmly entrenched" rule
back to the Mansfield Rule, the court cited Stotts v. Meyer 0 8 for the proposi-
tion that a juror's testimony or affidavit could not be used to impeach the
verdict based on alleged misconduct inside or outside the jury room. 10 9 But,
the majority recognized the exception carved out by the Missouri Supreme
Court in Travis v. Stone"10 allowing impeachment of a verdict by juror testi-
mony when such testimony alleges that "extrinsic evidentiary facts" were
interjected into the jury's deliberations."'
102. Id. at 882-83.
103. Id. at 883-84. The court noted that a presumption of prejudice arises when
there is proof of juror misconduct in obtaining extraneous evidence; however, the
court held that the presumption was rebutted because the extraneous evidence was
found to be immaterial. Id.
104. 114 S.W.3d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (transfer to the Missouri Supreme
Court denied on Sept. 30, 2003).
105. The court first addressed whether plaintiff had established, with a reasonable
degree of certainty, the portion of her present injuries attributable to defendant's con-
duct as opposed to her pre-existing condition. Id. at 358. The court then considered
whether plaintiff had presented submissible evidence supporting the trial court's in-
struction allowing recovery for lost earnings, lost earning capacity, and future medical
expenses. Id. at 363. Finally, after addressing the jury misconduct issue, the court
addressed defendant's argument that the trial court had erred in submitting a vague
verdict-directing instruction. Id. at 369-70.
106. Id. at 364.
107. Id. (citing Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)).
108. 822 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
109. Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 364.
110. 66 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
111. Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 365 ("Courts recognize an exception to this general
rule, however, and allow a party to attack a verdict on the ground that juror miscon-
[Vol. 69
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Before reaching the issue of whether the exception was applicable, the
majority first addressed Williams' argument that the jurors' testimony was
excluded solely because Williams had properly and timely objected to the
testimony.112 Although first referring to older precedent which held that such
testimony was per se inadmissible in the face of proper objection, the court
noted that the State v. Stephens 1 3 court had recently interpreted Travis to
mean that such evidence could be admissible despite proper objection. 114 The
majority chose to avoid resolving the objection issue and affirmed the trial
court's denial of Daus's motion for new trial on other grounds.
15
Though the majority recognized Missouri's adoption of the "extrinsic
evidence" exception,1 16 it held that the four jurors' testimony about Juror No.
2's comments during deliberations was inadmissible hearsay evidence. 1 7 In
addition, the majority inferred that the trial court must have found that Juror
No. 2 never actually visited Daus's hospital even though she may have told
the other jurors during deliberations that she had." 8 The majority opined that
the remarks of Juror No. 2 made during deliberations constituted "matters
inherent in the verdict" which could not be used to impeach the jury's ver-
dict. 19 The majority reasoned that if she had made up the story she told the
jury, then the jurors had acted on "'improper motives, reasoning, beliefs or
mental operations,"' which have been held in the past to be "matters inherent
in the verdict."'120 The majority concluded that the trial court, given great
deference in its factual findings, did not abuse its discretion in denying
Daus's motion for new trial. 121
B. The Dissent
Judge Montgomery's dissenting opinion, in which Judges Parrish and
Garrison concurred, argued that Travis and Stephens required a holding that
the jurors' testimony was properly admitted to impeach the verdict.'22 The
duct occurred outside the courtroom, such as when a juror gathers evidence extrane-
ous to the trial.").
112. Id. at 366.
113. 88 S.W.3d 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
114. Id. at 366-67 (citing Stephens, 88 S.W.3d at 882-83).
115. Id. at 367. The trial court received the juror affidavit and juror testimony in
the post-trial hearing over Williams' repeated objections, which suggests that the trial
court was following the Western District's interpretation of Travis. Id.
116. See supra note 111.
117. Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 367.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Neighbors v. Wolfson, 926 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
121. Id. at 369.
122. Id. at 376 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
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dissent noted that Neighbors v. Wolfson, 123 cited by the majority, was decided
prior to the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Travis,124 which held "that
juror testimony [was] permissible where the misconduct occur[red] outside
the jury room."' 25 The dissent also argued that under Travis, as interpreted
by Stephens, a failure to object to use of juror testimony is merely an alterna-
tive basis for allowing such testimony rather than a mandatory prerequisite
for admissibility of such testimony.' 26 Since the testimony was properly
admitted under the dissent's view, a presumption of prejudice arose which
shifted the burden to Williams to show a lack of prejudice. 127 Williams had
offered no evidence to rebut the presumed prejudice. 128
The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the four jurors
had given hearsay testimony. The dissent argued that the testimony was ex-
cepted from the hearsay rule because the relevance of Juror No. 2's statement
lay in the mere fact that she had made it to the other jurors. And in doing so,
she had brought extra-judicial evidence of her alleged visit to the hospital into
the jury room, regardless of whether her information was true or false. 129
While the majority had argued that a negative inference could be drawn
from the lack of testimony from Juror No. 2 herself, the dissent pointed to
authority holding that allowing such an inference constituted reversible error
where the witness was equally available to both parties. After analyzing the
factors relevant to this inquiry, the dissent concluded that no adverse infer-
ence could be drawn from Daus's failure to call Juror No. 2 as she had been
equally available to both parties. The dissent disagreed with the majority's
finding that Juror No. 2 had merely made up her story and concluded that it
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Daus's motion for new
trial.
C. The Concurrence
Judge Shrum filed a concurring opinion to respond to the arguments
made by the dissent, especially those on the hearsay issue. 30 Shrum argued
that the dissent's view would expand the scope of Travis and Stephens "be-
yond permissible limits" and create a new exception to the hearsay rule which
123. 926 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
124. Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 375 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 376 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Montgomery, J., dissenting) (citing Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp.,
996 S.W.2d 47, 59 (Mo. 1999) (en banc)) (noting that "a statement is not hearsay if
the relevance of the statement lies in the mere fact that it was made and no reliance is
placed on the [veracity] of the out-of-court declarant").
130. Id. at 373 (Shrum, J., concurring).
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had not been previously recognized.13 1 Based on Shrum's interpretation of
the recent Missouri authority, the extrinsic evidence exception only applies if
it is shown that extrinsic evidence was actually gathered by the offending
juror. 32 Shrum pointed to a footnote in Stotts which stated that a juror's tes-
timony about statements made by other jurors during deliberations constituted
inadmissible hearsay.'3 3 Thus, juror testimony about statements made by
Juror No. 2 would be inadmissible to prove that Juror No. 2 had "actually
gathered extrinsic evidence."' 134 Finding no other evidence in the record
showing introduction of extraneous evidence, the concurrence concluded that
the trial judge "did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a new trial
based upon alleged juror misconduct."'' 35
V. COMMENT
The majority opinion in Williams v. Daus136 leaves Missouri law on the
extraneous evidence exception to the Mansfield Rule in disarray. First, it
avoids answering the question of whether timely and proper objection serves
as an absolute bar to admissibility ofjuror testimony even when the testimony
alleges gathering of extra-judicial evidence by a juror.' 37 Second, the major-
ity applies the hearsay rule in an unprecedented manner to find an independ-
ent basis for excluding the juror testimony in question.' 38 The ultimate judg-
ment of the court, however, may be defensible in its deference to the trial
court's finding of a lack of prejudice.
The dissent's interpretation of Travis v. Stone 3 9 on the objection issue
appears to be correct.' As the court noted in Stephens, the Travis court
stated in clear and unambiguous terms that "it is permissible to elicit testi-
mony about juror misconduct that occurred outside the jury room, such as the
alleged gathering of extrinsic evidence at issue here."' 14 1 It would make little
sense to argue that the court "cut down" this exception in the same paragraph
131. Id. (Shrum, J., concurring).
132. Id. (Shrum, J., concurring) (citing State v. Stephens, 88 S.W.3d 876, 883
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002)).
133. Id. at 373-74 (Shrum, J., concurring) (citing Stotts v. Meyer, 822 S.W.2d
887, 888 n.1) (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)).
134. Id. at 374. (Shrum, J., concurring).
135. Id. (Shrum, J., concurring).
136. 114 S.W.3d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (transfer to the Missouri Supreme
Court denied on Sept. 30, 2003).
137. Id. at 367.
138. Id.
139. 66 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
140. See Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 375-76 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
141. State v. Stephens, 88 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Travis v.
Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)).
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by later requiring the absence of an objection from the opposing party. 142 As
the Williams dissent argues, the Travis court was merely recognizing waiver
as an alternative basis for admissibility of juror testimony. 143 The extraneous
evidence exception would not be an exception at all if it only applied in the
absence of objection. The Stotts opinion, on which Travis's extraneous evi-
dence exception is based, specifically states that the juror's testimony was
"competent and admissible" because it related to the juror's gathering of ex-
traneous evidence, a matter not inhering in the verdict. 144 This holding in the
Stotts opinion was independent of that court's later consideration of the alter-
native ground of admissibility, the absence of objection by the opposing
party.
145
It is difficult to find authority supporting the majority's application of
the hearsay rule to the jurors' testimony in Williams. 146 The concurring opin-
ion expands upon the majority's very brief consideration of the hearsay issue.
The concurring opinion argues that the four jurors' testimony is hearsay be-
cause the jurors testified about out-of-court statements made by Juror No. 2
and relied upon the truth of the matter asserted in Juror No. 2's statements.
1 47
In other words, the majority and concurrence would require that Juror No. 2's
statements be truthful before allowing the extraneous evidence exception to
be triggered. This would require proof of actual gathering of extrinsic evi-
dence before the four jurors' testimony could be admissible. Such reasoning
collapses the two step inquiry into one step and confuses the two distinct is-
sues of (1) competency, an evidentiary issue, and (2) prejudice, an issue of
substantive law as to whether misconduct warrants a new trial. 41 Whether
Juror No. 2 actually visited the defendant's hospital and obtained extra-
judicial evidence about the defendant's medical competence relates to the
trial court's weighing of evidence and findings of fact, an issue of substantive
142. Id. at 882-83.
143. Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 376 (Montgomery, J., dissenting) (quoting Stephens,
88 S.W.3d at 882-83).
144. Stotts v. Meyer, 822 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
145. Id. at 890-91.
146. Only two Missouri cases apply the hearsay rule to juror testimony offered to
impeach the verdict. See Buatte v Schnuck Markets, Inc., 98 S.W.3d 569, 574-75
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Rogers v. Steuermann, 552 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977). In Rogers, the jurors' affidavits were hearsay because they were unswom,
taken out of court, and taken out of the presence of the opposing party's counsel.
Rogers, 552 S.W.2d at 294.
147. Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 374 (Shrum, J., concurring).
148. See EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 60, at 139 ("Failure of some courts
clearly to separate these issues may account for some of the confusing opinions.");
see also Crump, supra note 3, at 525 ("[C]ourts continue to confuse the issue of com-
petency of juror testimony with the question whether the alleged misconduct merits
remedial action ... ").
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law distinct from the evidentiary issue of admissibility. 149 The dissent is cor-
rect to argue that the extraneous evidence exception is not dependent on the
truthfulness of Juror No. 2's statements.1 50 Her statements are only relevant
to prove the fact that they were made, and no reliance is placed on the credi-
bility of those statements. Therefore, the four jurors' testimony that Juror No.
2 made the statements is excepted from the hearsay rule.151 It is clear that
applying the hearsay rule to the four jurors' testimony in this case merely
circumvents application of the Mansfield Rule and the extraneous evidence
exception. When juror testimony alleges the gathering of extrinsic evidence
by jurors, it becomes admissible under Travis's extraneous evidence excep-
tion.' 52 On the question of admissibility, it seems both silly and infeasible to
distinguish between a juror who has actually gathered extra-judicial evidence
and one who has merely lied to his fellow jurors about gathering such evi-
dence. A more prudent means of handling such a situation would be to admit
the testimony and then allow the trial court to determine the credibility of the
evidence presented in determining whether a new trial is warranted.
The majority and concurring opinions' application of the hearsay rule
would also only allow the testimony of the alleged offending juror or a nonju-
ror to be admissible. For unknown reasons, Juror No. 2 was not subpoenaed
to testify in the post-trial hearing.' 53 The majority concluded that her absence
raised the presumption that she would have testified that she had not visited
the defendant's hospital or obtained extraneous evidence.' 54 This would have
been of no consequence to the applicability of the extraneous evidence excep-
tion because her truthfulness was only relevant to the determination of the
substantive issue of whether juror activity prejudiced the verdict. Of all the
jurors, it makes little sense to allow only the offending juror to testify as to
the gathering of extraneous evidence. The original reasoning behind Lord
Mansfield's Rule was that jurors who would testify as to their own miscon-
duct were not to be trusted. 155 So, if anyone's testimony should be inadmis-
149. The concurring opinion cites Stephens for the proposition that the issue is
"whether Juror No. 2 actually gathered extrinsic evidence." Williams, 114 S.W.3d at
374 (Shrum, J., concurring) (citing State v. Stephens, 822 S.W.2d 876, 883 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2002)). But, this language from Stephens is misplaced. The Stephens opinion
was merely stating that misconduct must have actually occurred before the movant
can be entitled to a new trial, which deals with the substantive issue of prejudice
rather than the evidentiary issue of competency.
150. See id. at 376-77 (Montgomery, J., dissenting) (citing Rodriguez v. Suzuki
Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 59 (Mo. 1999) (en banc)).
151. Id. (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
152. Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) ("[I]t is permissible to
elicit testimony about juror misconduct that occurred outside the jury room, such as
the alleged gathering of extrinsic evidence at issue here.").
153. Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 368.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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sible, it should be that of the alleged offending juror. Missouri courts have
reasoned that juror testimony about matters inherent in the verdict should be
inadmissible because the proof of a juror's mental process is "'locked in the
breast of the juror, and is not capable of refutation or corroboration."' ' 15 6
However, a juror's alleged visit of an accident scene or gathering of extra-
judicial evidence outside the jury room is often capable of corroboration or
refutation. Consequently, juror testimony about the gathering of extra-
judicial evidence should be admissible because it is capable of objective
proof.
Under the majority's analysis, nonjurors could still testify about a ju-
ror's gathering of extraneous evidence. However, a nonjuror would not be
able to testify as to whether the extraneous evidence had been "interjected
into the jury's deliberations. " 57 The Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Tele-
phone Co.15 8 court, which created the "Iowa Rule,"' 1 9 disapproved of distin-
guishing nonjurors from jurors, because "jurors should be more accurate wit-
nesses to their own misconduct than a spy.
16 °
Although the majority and concurring opinions' interpretation of the
Travis extraneous evidence exception may have deprived it of any real mean-
ing, the judgment may still be defensible. If the trial court in fact determined
that Juror No. 2 did not gather extra-judicial evidence and no prejudice re-
sulted to the defendant, then the trial court may have properly exercised its
discretion in finding that a new trial was not warranted by Juror No. 2's
statements. This step of the analysis was a foregone conclusion for the ma-
jority and concurring opinions, however, since they found the evidence inad-
missible as hearsay. Though the court may have achieved the proper result,
the means used to get there were questionable and arguably incompatible
with the law of Travis v. Stone.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Williams opinion seems to contravene the policy espoused by Mis-
souri precedent which views attempts by jurors to gain extra-judicial evidence
as intolerable. 6 1 Missouri courts have held that a juror may not independ-
156. Baumle v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 341, 348 (Mo. 1967) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v.
Klinge, 65 F.2d 85, 88 (10th Cir. 1933)) (explaining Missouri's policy behind adher-
ence to the Mansfield Rule).
157. Williams, 114 S.W.3d at 365 (quoting Neighbors v. Wolfson, 926 S.W.2d 35,
37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)).
158. 20 Iowa 195, (1866).
159. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
160. Crump, supra note 3, at 516 n.44; see also Wright, 20 Iowa at 210-12.
161. Travis v. Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) ("Our trial procedures
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ently seek evidence,' 62 visit the scene of an accident,' 63 or inform other jurors
of his personal knowledge of the circumstances of the case.1" While Mis-
souri courts have carved out an exception to their otherwise strict application
of the Mansfield Rule when jurors gather extra-judicial evidence and relate it
to other jurors, inconsistencies prevent this exception from having its in-
tended ameliorative goals.
Though Missouri courts have traditionally been hesitant to stray from
strict adherence to the Mansfield Rule, recent decisions, including Travis v.
Stone, seem to indicate a liberalizing trend. Unfortunately, courts have inter-
preted Travis's extraneous evidence exception inconsistently, leaving Mis-
souri law governing admissibility of juror testimony unclear. A clear inter-
pretation of Travis is needed to determine where the balance between finality
of verdicts and fair administration ofjustice will ultimately lie in Missouri.
JASON R. MUDD
162. Middleton v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 152 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1941).
163. Douglass v. Mo. Cafeteria, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
164. Cook v. Kansas City, 214 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Mo. 1948).
2004]
19
Mudd: Mudd: Liberalizing the Mansfield Rule in Missouri:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss3/6
